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Abstract This paper proposes a model of human uniqueness based on an unusual
distinction between two contrasted kinds of political competition and political status:
(1) antagonistic competition, in quest of dominance (antagonistic status), a zero-sum,
self-limiting game whose stake—who takes what, when, how—summarizes a classical
definition of politics (Lasswell 1936), and (2) synergistic competition, in quest of merit
(synergistic status), a positive-sum, self-reinforcing game whose stake becomes “who
brings what to a team’s common good.” In this view, Rawls’s (1971) famous virtual
“veil of ignorance” mainly conceals politics’ antagonistic stakes so as to devise the
principles of a just, egalitarian society, yet without providing any means to enforce
these ideals (Sen 2009). Instead, this paper proposes that human uniqueness flourished
under a real “adapted veil of ignorance” concealing the steady inflation of synergistic
politics which resulted from early humans’ sturdy egalitarianism. This proposition
divides into four parts: (1) early humans first stumbled on a purely cultural means to
enforce a unique kind of within-team antagonistic equality—dyadic balanced deter-
rence thanks to handheld weapons (Chapais 2008); (2) this cultural innovation is thus
closely tied to humans’ darkest side, but it also launched the cumulative evolution of
humans’ brightest qualities—egalitarian team synergy and solidarity, together with the
associated synergistic intelligence, culture, and communications; (3) runaway syner-
gistic competition for differential merit among antagonistically equal obligate team-
mates is the single politically selective mechanism behind the cumulative evolution of
all these brighter qualities, but numerous factors to be clarified here conceal this mighty
evolutionary driver; (4) this veil of ignorance persists today, which explains why
humans’ unique prosocial capacities are still not clearly understood by science. The
purpose of this paper is to start lifting this now-ill-adapted veil of ignorance, thus
uncovering the tight functional relations between egalitarian team solidarity and the
evolution of human uniqueness.
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This paper proposes an “egalitarian hypothesis of human uniqueness” which clarifies
and reconciles a wealth of extant cross-disciplinary evidence, from primatology and
human paleontology to hunter-gatherers’ behavioral ecology, anthropology, and ar-
chaeology, including general principles of animal behavior, evolutionary psychology,
and political philosophy. The model also emphasizes many political aspects of the
human condition—notably, the quest for maximum merit (“like” scores) and minimum
demerit (“dislike” scores) among peers and teammates—which, while extremely
familiar, remain neglected in behavioral ecology (but see Henrich and Gil-White
2001:170) and very confused in political economics. For example, citizens of modern
meritocracies are familiar with the idea that individual differences in merit—as roughly
measured by “who brings what to the common good,” a synergistic stake therefore—
are often rewarded by large disparities in “who gets what share of the common output”
(see Piketty and Saez 2014), an antagonistic stake according to the simple definition
proposed here. This conventional wisdom holds that such contrasted antagonistic
rewards are powerful individual incentives without which the common good of eco-
nomic and cultural progress would remain sluggish.
By contrast, this paper proposes that, starting from chimpanzeelike societies which
were far from egalitarian, the evolutionary and cultural progress which gave rise to
human uniqueness derived from the steady inflation of a purely synergistic form of
competition—a race to maximize merit (“like” scores) and minimize demerit (“dislike”
scores)—wherein everyone got an equal share of team synergy’s common benefits, and
this, among other reasons, because any unequal share was associated with strong
“dislike” scores (obvious signs of demerit) liable to all sorts of collective punishment.
This kind of coalitionary punishment is often invoked to explain human egalitarianism,
as recently emphasized in Boehm’s (2012) landmark Moral Origins. However, within
an already hierarchical order, any coalition will necessarily end up hierarchical too,
eventually changing the political order, but only to another hierarchical one. Therefore,
the capacity to collectively weed out and punish individual demerit is certainly an
important aspect of human egalitarianism, but it cannot be its primary cause, nor the
primary driver of human uniqueness’s brighter aspects.
The triggering of early humans’ unique political egalitarianism, and its maintenance
up until its Neolithic breakdown, is here more precisely ascribed to a simple, fast-
spreading cultural innovation: the antagonistic balance of deterrence afforded by
handheld weapons—clubs, sticks, and stones, or “technological weapons” as proposed
by Chapais (2008:176–177)—leading to a purely dyadic form of antagonistic equality,
which nonetheless ensures that no one can impose his will but through a process of
quorum formation,1 the ensuing synergistic quorums necessarily remaining egalitarian
for the same reason. In this view, collective punishment becomes a challenge of
quorum formation among antagonistic equals, but so do all other, more positive
collective endeavors. Hence the notion of egalitarian team synergy, with the ensuing
1 Quorum: the number of members of a group required to carry out a collective action or synergistic activity.
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selective yet quorum-dependent political competition among obligate teammates with
different political aptitudes, attitudes, and behaviors, both antagonistic and synergistic.
Now, even if the number of possible teammates is limited within a small egalitarian
team, all their appreciated, merit-worthy attitudes become open-access behaviors, 2
which can be freely emulated and followed, and whose possible combinations (the
different “what, where, when, how, and with whom” of collective action) multiply
accordingly, hence the inflationary potential of synergistic competition among
antagonistic equals.
Why compete for maximum merit (“like” scores) and minimum demerit (“dislike”
scores) in such uniquely egalitarian settings? This question will be examined repeatedly
throughout this paper, but the shortest and most proximate answer boils down to the
fact that, among antagonistic equals, differential merit (synergistic political fitness)
becomes the best means to recruit and be recruited—that is, the best means to build up
or join the most effective synergistic quorums according to one’s own best interests,
merit also remaining the best means to avoid quorum punishment. If correct, this
suggests that the root of humans’ brightest qualities, the open-access, quorum-
dependent quest for merit among antagonistically equal obligate teammates, is some-
what neglected by current evolutionary approaches of animal and human behavior. The
contrast with the attention granted to limited-access dominance is striking. According
to one of this paper’s main propositions, this disregard for open-access merit is a
predictable effect of the adapted veil of ignorance which has concealed syner-
gistic competition’s mighty dynamics since the onset of human egalitarianism.
The ensuing paradoxical mix of procedural familiarity and foggy declarative
awareness persists today, thus demanding that the veil in question be lifted at
least somewhat before discussing human uniqueness’s other aspects, especially
the darker ones. Indeed, without a proper lens to see the light first, it is
extremely difficult to imagine how the darkness of balanced deterrence could
have triggered and sustained the inflation of open-access quorum synergy and
the evolution of all the brighter aspects of human uniqueness all along the
Paleolithic.
This paper thus proceeds in two parts, a first theoretical half on egalitarian team
synergy’s quorum-dependent dynamics with its adapted veil of ignorance, and a second
half on early humans’ unique behavioral ecology as revealed behind this veil. Likewise
for the abundant empirical evidence on hunter-gatherers’ egalitarianism, as for Rawls’
virtual veil of ignorance: both are discussed in the second half because their peculiar-
ities are better appreciated after some examination of egalitarian team synergy’s
dynamics. Current models of cooperation and human uniqueness are discussed
alongside. Concerning the antagonistic equality afforded by handheld weapons, recall
the famous quote from Lee (1969) reported by Trivers (1971:45) about a common
saying of Bushmen when their discussions near confrontation: “We are none of us big,
and others small; we are all men and we can fight: I’m going to get my
arrows.” The similar leveling effect of more primitive weapons is discussed in this
paper’s second half.
2 See North et al. (2009) for the notion of “open-access” political power and competition, with numerous
illustrations of their utmost significance all along human (post-Neolithic) history.
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Mapping Political Synergy’s Territory
The first half of this paper divides into three parts, a first one mapping political
synergy’s territory, a second one comparing antagonistic competition and synergistic
competition, to see how and where cumulative inflation develops once team synergy
arises among antagonistic equals, and a third one comparing the numerous stark
contrasts between dominance and merit among antagonistic equals, to see why an
adapted veil of ignorance necessarily develops over the runaway quest for the latter. To
begin, I briefly outline the unmapped territory of synergistic politics, synergistic
competition and teammate choice in social animals so as to picture the quest for merit’s
broader biological context. Of course, the notion of synergy (from the Greek roots syn
and ergon, for “work together”) overlaps that of cooperation, but the former better
emphasizes the unavoidably competitive and politically selective nature of cooperation
in social animals as soon as they have enough time to know each other and thus build
up sturdy (antagonistic and synergistic) reputations for themselves; hence the political—
who’s who—nature of their interactions. Three branching pairs of core distinctions can
briefly delineate the field of synergistic politics:
1. A first already evoked distinction between two opposite forms of political
competition:
& Antagonistic competition, about who gets what share of the available material
resources, whether individually gathered or collectively produced.
& Synergistic competition, about who brings what contribution to the common
good, that of a team or any other dyadic or polyadic partnership among familiar
individuals.
2. A second distinction between two branching forms of individualized within-group
synergy, beyond the anonymous forms of herd synergy (Hamilton 1971):
& Micro synergy: mutualism, reciprocity, and cooperation among a limited num-
ber of familiar, well-identified group mates, usually no more than two or three.
& Whole-group team synergy in between-team competition.
3. A third distinction between two branching kinds of whole-group team synergy:
& Hierarchical team synergy: whole-group teamwork under a stable antagonistic
order.
& Egalitarian team synergy: whole-group teamwork among antagonistically
equal teammates—a human singularity, as proposed here.
According to this framework, human uniqueness developed because early humans
were the first social animals to cross the threshold of “egalitarian team synergy” from a
previous state of chimpanzeelike “hierarchical team synergy.” In this view, demanding
forms of whole-group cooperation and collective action such as teamwork and team
solidarity in between-team competition cannot normally develop except within an
already stable and reliable antagonistic rank order, thus usually giving rise to strictly
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hierarchical forms of whole-group team synergy. In such circumstances typical of most
cooperative breeding animals (a wolf pack, for example), whole-group team synergy
remains a strictly limited-access game where (a) positive-sum synergistic displays of
prestige can sometimes replace mere zero-sum antagonistic displays of dominance
(Zahavi 1977, 1990, 1995; Zahavi and Zahavi 1997), but where (b) leadership and most
of team synergy’s positive-sum benefits are monopolized by alpha dominants because of
the underlying hierarchical order. Early humans escaped this political straitjacket thanks to
the antagonistic balance of deterrence afforded by handheld weapons. Which suggests
that, for animals already specialized in the mutual dependence and the tightly constrained
forms of synergistic competition typical of hierarchical teams, such a fast neutralization of
within-team antagonistic competition could have led to an inflationary escalation of
synergistic competition: an open-access runaway quest for “like” scores and merit-
worthy displays through an escalatory “who brings what, when, how” to a team’s common
good. Among antagonistic equals, this runaway expansion of synergistic competition
would thus become an unbridled evolutionary driver responsible for the emergence and
diversification of all the brighter aspects of human uniqueness, notably the inflationary
expansion of synergistic intelligence, culture, and communications (language).
Equality’s Perils and Promises
Of course, this brighter dynamics of open-access synergy is far from a guarantee of
political stability or collective progress. Indeed, while the number of possibly effective
quorums always remains limited, in contrast, an open access to merit greatly increases
the number of possible, and sometimes opposing, proposals about quorum synergy’s
“what, where, when, how, and with whom?” with ensuing, unavoidably numerous and
predictable proto-debates and negotiations, often confronting the merit of different
proposers. As a result of such open-access daily deliberations for quorum formation,
egalitarian team synergy becomes uniquely rich in possibilities for both (a) progresses
in synergistic coordination, effectiveness, and solidarity but also (b) regresses and
stagnations because of collective mistakes, fruitless oppositions, conflicts, and scis-
sions. The bio-physical world is complex, often obscure and unpredictable, and
collectively tackling its innumerable challenges is often difficult, even for good-
willed contemporary humans enlightened by science. But remarkably, there is one
debate-related domain in which cumulative inflation is not only possible but almost
unavoidable, once open-access antagonistic equality is ensured among obligate team-
mates: this is the limitless immaterial world of low-cost synergistic communications,
the realm of synergistic coordination signals, which immediately benefit all those who
produce and catch as many intelligible messages as possible while involved in the
open-access synergistic debates required for quorum formation. Such coordination
signals don’t have to be costly to be reliable (Grafen 1990; Zahavi 1977) because they
are exchanged between familiar teammates trying to understand and influence each
other while managing their egalitarian teamwork. For the same reason, these low-cost
signals can be simple, arbitrary—thus symbolic and infinitely modifiable—utterances
or signs, provided they are understood by their intended audience, whose attention and
reactions will often depend on the senders’ merit. Boesch (1991) reports a unique
instance of such simple symbolic signals in wild chimpanzees. No wonder that
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egalitarian early humans could have greatly improved such a trade, the quest for
individual merit thus ultimately fueling the daily proximate expansion (production
and imitation) of the most merit-worthy symbolic signals. The ensuing domain-
specific yet predictably limitless informational inflation is the topic of the next section,
focused on the stark differences therein between limited-access hierarchical and open-
access egalitarian synergistic debates.
Egalitarian Communications’ Inflation
As evoked above, the difference between antagonistic and synergistic competition boils
down to the fact that the first is a zero-sum (often even negative-sum), self-limiting
game whereas the second is the opposite, a positive-sum, self-reinforcing one. Antag-
onistic competition is zero-sum because what is taken by the winners is lost for the
losers, and it is also self-limiting because animals necessarily avoid useless fights and
fruitless interactions and debates, thus converging toward antagonistic equilibriums,
those of linear rank orders. Conversely, synergy is a positive-sum self-reinforcing game
because it favors the recurrence and multiplication of mutually fruitful interactions,
hence a possible divergence from a status quo. Of course, this positive-sum self-
reinforcing effect can develop even within a hierarchy, but it cannot escape the
straitjacket of such a rank order. This is precisely where the neutralization of antago-
nistic competition, thanks to balanced deterrence, produces its inflationary effects.
The political straitjacket constraining social animals’ synergy is examined first.
Indeed, synergistic competition is severely bounded by these animals’ hierarchical
orders for three reasons. Briefly:
1. Because, except for their closest beta opponents, alpha dominants can easily
oppose any cooperative association among their lower subordinates, especially if
this cooperation jeopardizes their dominance.
2. Because even for politically inconsequential forms of micro synergy (technical
cooperation among a limited number of participants), subordinate cooperators can
hardly defend the material products of their cooperation (food reserves, for exam-
ple) against the plundering of dominants, a permanent risk much more detrimental
to the development of cooperation than cheating and free-riding, two strategies also
hardly sustainable within small groupings of familiar individuals.
3. Finally, when dominants welcome cooperation as they do in cooperative breeders—
among whom some subordinate helpers find some benefits in joining such
dominant-managed cooperation, most often between parents and offspring—the
ensuing tightly hierarchical team synergy has three unavoidable properties consti-
tutive of a genuine political straitjacket:
a. The participants and their synergistic interactions remain closely policed by
alpha leaders.
b. Such hierarchical team synergy therefore remains strongly biased in favor of
alpha breeders.
c. The quest for (synergistic) prestige can possibly develop as a useful daily
substitute for (antagonistic) dominance (Zahavi 1977, 1990), but for subordinate
helpers, this kind of limited-access competition remains bounded between two
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evils: (i) the narrow benefits afforded by the hierarchical order and the alpha
breeders’ ruthlessly enforced reproductive privileges, and (ii) the perilous option
of leaving the group and starting a new political career elsewhere, when possible.
The contrast with early humans’ synergistic competition among antagonistic equals
is striking. Indeed, here is a competitive quest for open-access merit which offers much
more leeway to all contestants whatever their physical strength, thus favoring the
exploitation of all sorts of other individual qualities beyond mere antagonistic capacity.
But in addition, it is a competition in which one of the best ways to succeed is to
contribute more to the welfare of one’s competitors, provided they belong to the same
party. All of synergy’s material outputs (food, shelter, etc.) being then shared equally
(see the discussion of hunter-gatherers’ egalitarianism below), and the winners being
those who bring the most to the welfare of others, there are much fewer reasons to stop
such contests and reach a stable equilibrium. Of course, as mentioned above, crucial
factors still hinder such open-access cooperation, but remarkably, they are not the ones
usually considered in game-theoretical models—cheating and free-riding (Axelrod and
Hamilton 1981; Trivers 1971). Again, once the numerous “what, where, when, how,
and with whom” of quorum synergy become open-access, their possible combinations
multiply accordingly, while the best course of collective action is rarely evident, even
for contemporary humans. Hence the combinatorial explosion of debates and deliber-
ations, then as now, however limited the means of deliberation at the onset. A totally
new game-theoretical question therefore arises: what happens to cooperation once
cheating and free-riding are barely possible because of familiarity and quorum punish-
ment and, to the contrary, competitive synergy is the most effective means to serve both
one’s own best interests and those of the whole community? Progress is not guaranteed,
but another consequence of open-access merit is: whatever consensus develops, it will
be emulated, followed, and eventually reproduced across generations because all
associated behaviors become merit-worthy in the eyes of consensus members while
remaining open-access thanks to antagonistic equality.
In this way, the quest for open-access merit can foster the improvement of any
already-established equilibrium, provided these improvements fit the preferences of
enough teammates. Yet, once confronted by the biophysical world’s complexities,
obscurities, and uncertainties, this political freedom can also lead to all sorts of costly
mistakes; hence the adapted conservatism and relatively slow progress of early
humans’ material culture evidenced by the archaeological record. Yet again, there is
one unbounded immaterial world, that of open-access synergistic communications,
with its politically selected means of debating and understanding, where limitless cross-
generational inflation is guaranteed from the outset of egalitarianism, driving the steady
expansion of humans’ linguistic capacities with the associated, fossilizable, steadily
increasing brain volume, another salient feature of humans’ paleontological record—
see Fig. 1’s schematic timeline, to be discussed further below.
Political Selection’s Devo-Evo Mechanics
A derived, detailed model of language evolution will be proposed in a subsequent
article, but for now, a simple evolutionary framework already emerges from the above
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basic dynamics: whatever the contrasted paces of early humans’ progresses in material
and symbolic culture, the cumulative growth of human uniqueness stems from a
multilevel, bottom-up, devo-evo (developmental first, and evolutionary next; see Hall
2000) process of political selection where (a) the quest for merit drives the “devo” arm
of the process, the steady cross-generational growth of synergistic competition’s
pressures bearing on all individuals, and (b) another reproductively selective mecha-
nism drives the “evo” arm of the process. In short, starting with the devo arm:
1. Individual political actors select their individual and collective behaviors, choose
their teammates, and elect their leaders according to their differential merit in all
their daily activities—partners, quorums, and party choices—throughout their
lifetime.
2. These lifelong synergistic selections of partners, leaders, behaviors, and signals
thus simultaneously select the most effective and appreciated cultural ways and
Neolithic Revolution: domestication of animals
and plants (+ settlement), this leading to the
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Fig. 1 A schematic timeline showing human evolution’s main features and their starkly asymmetrical
developments. The paleontological record on Homo erectus clearly features an unprecedented mix of
geographical expansion together with a steady expansion of the brain volume, yet without any associated
sign of significant cultural progress all along the Lower and Middle Paleolithic. Indeed, after reviewing the
available evidence on the very slow developments in stone tool technologies during this whole period, Mithen
(1999:394) concludes: “As several archeologists have commented, it is the remarkable stability in technology,
and culture in general, during the Middle Pleistocene which is in most need of explanation, not the presence of
change.” Boaz and Ciochon (2004:141) concur: “We agree that some sort of cognitive advance had occurred
in Homo erectus. But equally intriguing is the fact that whatever that advance represented, it seems to have
stayed virtually static for some one million years, the length of time that bifaces and similar chopping tools
dominated Homo erectus lithic culture.”
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means of political and technical teamwork, the most appreciated “what, when,
where, and how” of synergistic (who’s who) competition. These open-access
behaviors therefore become ever more numerous, demanding, yet requisite means
to acquire merit, thereby increasing the “devo” pressures of political selection and
synergistic competition on all participants.
No wonder why, in contrast, the “devo” quest for dominance and limited-access
prestige in social animals can only lead to stationary cultures and communications always
constrained within the same recurring—thus evolutionarily stationary—antagonistic equi-
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Fig. 2 From political fitness to biological fitness: How does political self-construction in antagonistic and
synergistic competition shape sociality? (1) In line with the principle of methodological individualism, this
diagram emphasizes the single individual process behind all sociopolitical constructions: the lifelong, piece-
meal, trial-and-error process of political self-construction. In this view, social animals progressively build-up,
optimize and advertise their political fitness all along their lifetime. Antagonistic self-construction is the most
basic and most universal form of political self-construction in social animals, followed by different forms of
micro synergy, sometimes developing into whole-group hierarchical team synergy. In early humans, the
dyadic balance of deterrence afforded by handheld weapons neutralized within-group antagonistic competi-
tion, thus leading to an inflationary escalation of synergistic self-construction among antagonistic equals. (2)
Individual dominance derives from “who gets what,” the main stake in antagonistic competition. (3)
Individual merit and prestige derive from “who brings what to the common good,” the main stake in
synergistic competition. (4) Examples of antagonistic political structures: hierarchies, dominance ranks,
hierarchical teams. (5) Examples of synergistic political structures: (a) micro (dyadic and triadic) partnerships
and friendships; (b) quorums, parties, majorities, whole-group teams, and the associated leadership structures.
(6) “Niche construction” as an evolutionary factor was originally proposed by Odling-Smee et al. (1996) and
Laland et al. (2000)
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could an individual’s “devo” political fitness be turned into “evo” differential reproduction
(biological fitness) in a realm of egalitarian team solidarity? In normal times, within such
egalitarian groupings of manymonogamous pairs (see below) one would expect very little
differences in fecundity between participants, somewhat like what happens in monoga-
mous animals. What’s more, and in contrast with animals, egalitarian early humans could
count on their teammates’ help in times of individual hardship, a temporary parental
incapacity because of sickness or injury for example (Gurven et al. 2000). Where could
differential reproduction come from in such uniquely egalitarian settings?
Of course, a whole team’s synergistic fitness should influence its successes and
failures in between-team competition, and the ensuing group-selective process could
bear on the differential reproduction of all teammates, as repeatedly suggested since
Darwin (1871). But there is a much more powerful, individually selective process at
work here. Indeed, in one recurring kind of hardship the available help from teammates
is necessarily limited, and thus predictably distributed very selectively according to
each one’s cumulative merit. This is in times of collective hardship—famines or surprise
attacks by enemy neighbors, for example—evolutionary bottlenecks, therefore, wherein
each one’s political record can turn into differential survival and reproduction. The
selective mechanism is strategic and subtle, and it is probably the most basic “evo”
(ultimate) reason why the veil of ignorance over synergistic competition is so deeply
ingrained within the human psyche. However, its examination is better delayed until the
second half of this paper. First, with the actual theoretical outline in mind, we must
examine the more proximate “devo” factors behind this veil of ignorance, the reasons
why the uniquely synergistic dynamics at work in early humans could have remained so
barely accessible to the declarative awareness of all participants, and this, throughout the
millennia during which, as a result of the same mighty dynamics, these increasingly
gifted debaters were putting ever more words on ever more features of their world. Why
ignore the most strategic of these features, the subtleties of competitive merit-seeking
among peers? To answer this question, the next section discusses a few other stark
differences between the “devo” quest for dominance and that for merit.
Lifting the Veil
The proposed further comparison between limited-access dominance and open-access
merit first boils down to four new opposites: dominance is altogether imposed, one-
dimensional, transitive, and symmetrical, whereas merit among antagonistic equals is
the exact opposite since it is altogether granted, multidimensional, intransitive, and
antisymmetrical. These opposites are now examined one by one, they all contribute to
dominance’s straightforward assessment and advertisement, in contrast with the intri-
cate subtleties and constraints veiling merit’s assessment and advertisement:
1. Dimensionality: Individual dominance (antagonistic fitness, a capacity to take and
keep something against the will of a fellow group-mate) is essentially one-
dimensional since, in animals, it ultimately rests on mere strength and fighting ability.
In contrast, individual merit (synergistic fitness) is multidimensional since, especially
among antagonistic equals, there is an infinite number of possible ways andmeans for
an individual to acquire merit in the eyes of regular partners and teammates:
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a. differential merit in different collective tasks—hunting, defense, foraging,
childcare, etc.;
b. differential merit according to the different, often opposite requirements of
different collective tasks—strength vs. skill, boldness vs. cautiousness, swift-
ness vs. precision, etc.;
c. differential merit according to the different preferences of different partners.
Note in passing the similarity between the multidimensionality of merit and that of
intelligence.
2. Transitivity: Because of its one-dimensionality, dominance is also transitive, both
properties making it very easy to assess and advertise. That is, among three contes-
tants A, B, and C in antagonistic competition, if A > B and B > C, then A > C; hence
the clear-cut linearity of antagonistic rank orders (A > B > C > D…). In contrast,
because of its multidimensionality, merit can be very intransitive (Henrich and Gil-
White 2001:170) and thus much more difficult to compare from one individual to
another. Indeed, individual A can gather more merit than B in activity X (AX > BX),
while B can gather more merit than A in activity Y (BY > AY), whereas B can equal
A for activity Z (AZ = BZ) and so on, not to mention the intransitivity of the
preferences of those who grant this merit. Differential merit therefore becomes very
difficult to assess precisely, and in absence of language and gossip, it remains
invisible for non-witnesses and outsiders.
Note however that if A > (B, C, D…) in many activities X, Y, Z… and in the eyes of
many partners and teammates, A’s cumulated merit translates into higher synergistic
influence, which in turn translates into some amounts of prestige and leadership. These
latter cumulative forms of merit therefore appear as two forms of “synergistic dominance,”
whichmust not be confusedwith their one-dimensional antagonistic counterpart, the reason
why the term dominance is here reserved for antagonistic forms of political influence.
However, while merit is invisible for non-witnesses and outsiders, in contrast, prestige and
leadership share some of the salience of dominance, which makes them both easily visible
even for outsiders. This salience will become extremely important in the transmission of
language and culture. Indeed, all humans start their political career as cultural outsiders—
that is, as naive political actors totally dependent on salient models of political fitness so as
to guide the building up of their own political fitness all along their development. Each
generation will therefore tend to reproduce the most salient—thus already “proven”—
cultural and political models of the previous generation. Note also that, for beginners and
outsiders, the numerous possible “what, where, when, how, and with whom” of the quest
for open-access merit become as many possible occasions to make costly developmental
mistakes, another good reason for them to stubbornly stick to the most salient and
obviously successful political models, whatever those models are (see below, about the
post-Neolithic transition from egalitarian to strikingly unegalitarian models).
3. Symmetry: Whatever the salience of leadership and prestige, dominance nonethe-
less remains superiorly salient because it is also symmetrical. Indeed, there is always
an obvious tangible symmetry between an individual’s antagonistic rank and the
same individual’s material holdings, an obvious symmetry between “who takes
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what’ and “what is taken”; hence the well-known effectiveness of RHP (Resource-
Holding-Power) displays. In contrast, among antagonistic equals such as human
hunter-gatherers, all material resources (food, shelter, etc.) are shared equally, while
inequalities inmerit acquired through daily differential contributions to the common
good can be easily blurred, especially whenmerged within the joint contributions of
many teammates. The symmetry between an individual’s merit and his/her material
holdings is therefore broken, even reversed, since the less one takes for oneself, and
the more one brings to the common good, the more one’s merit grows in the eyes of
witnesses. This antisymmetry therefore becomes the rule of the ensuing “competi-
tive altruism” (Barclay 2004; Hardy and Van Vugt 2006; Roberts 1998; Van Vugt
et al. 2007) once such a game (who brings more to the common good) develops
among antagonistically equal teammates, further increasing the intricacies associa-
ted with the multidimensional assessment of inequalities in synergistic fitness.
Again, note in passing how, in a realm of egalitarian team synergy, as in that of human
intelligence, “inequalities” in merit often derive from “differences” in talents, leanings,
and abilities, such multidimensional differences in personality (see Wolf et al. 2007 on
the evolution of animal personalities) often improving the whole team’s synergistic
capacity instead of lessening it. Yet again, while contrasted personalities can improve a
team’s effectiveness, they can also foster its fission into diverging quorums.
4. Forcibility: Last but not least, whereas dominance is imposed upon subordinates,
merit is freely granted (Henrich andGil-White 2001) according to contributions to the
common good, provided these contributions are witnessed and appreciated by fellow
group-mates. In other words, the synergistic influence derived from differential merit
among antagonistic equals is conditional on the recognition and appreciation of
partners and teammates. Such a political status therefore becomes a positional asset
freely granted according to the likings of peers who are simultaneously competitors
for the same open-access status and the same synergistic influence. Since these
competitors can easily change their minds if the least bit displeased, the acquisition,
buildup, and advertisement of merit is necessarily exposed to extremely demanding
constraints, most of them diametrically opposed to those of dominance. That is, like
dominance, one’s differential merit must be won over that of competitors, but unlike
dominance, one’s merit must not overshadow one’s peers’ own merit on pain of
upsetting them, thus reducing one’s merit instead of raising it. Of course, the same
holds for prestige, the most coveted form of cumulative merit.
Remarkably then, the simple fact that merit and prestige are granted and cannot be
imposed in antagonistic equals ensures that tactful modesty when building up and
advertising one’s own merit becomes compulsory, a “declarative” restraint all the more
indicated considering the unavoidable entanglement of individual and collective merit in
a realm of egalitarian synergy. In addition and for the same reasons, a double form of
compassion (solidarity in both successes and failures) becomes equally compulsory:
how indeed could anyone rejoice about one’s own success and merit if no one else has
any reason to rejoice? Better wait for this success to be shared so as to rejoice in
common—or even better, use one’s talents and resources to lessen others’ difficulties,
thus further improving one’s merit. Not only is arrogance counterproductive in such
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circumstances, and not only are modesty, fairness, generosity, and compassion better
indicated, but most importantly, all such displays of apparent selflessness necessarily
undergo a competitive escalation, in close step with that of altruism. Remarkably then,
despite a thorough exploration of human (antagonistic) self-deception, Robert Trivers
(2011) could have missed its brightest, most important form: the modest and empath-
ically synergistic one distinctive of egalitarian humans. However, lest this appear too
good to be true, note how all these powerful synergistic constraints are tightly team-
specific and can rapidly reverse into genuine hostility and counter-compassion—pas-
sionate chauvinism or xenophobic scorn—after a single bitter political scission. Indeed,
a conspicuous detestation of the opponent team is often required of all participants in
between-team competition, as in within-team displays of bellicose solidarity.
In sum, the stark differences between dominance and merit among equals suggest
how, all along humans’ egalitarian past, synergistic competition and the “devo” quest
for differential merit could have been concealed by competitive modesty, solidarity, and
compassionate altruism in interior politics, while being totally “outshined” by their
overt counterpart in exterior politics, the arrogant detestation of opponent parties and
enemies. This would only add to the subtleties associated with individual merit’s
assessment—multidimensionality, intransitivity, reversed symmetry, and subjectivity.
But there are still more confusing “devo” factors. To see them, one must now clarify the
crucial differences between dominance and the three different salient forms that
prestige takes in different political settings. As already suggested, the salience of
prestige (cumulative merit) can be easily confused with that of dominance, thus adding
to the fog surrounding differential merit, especially in the hierarchies of the post-
Neolithic era, those of modern meritocracies included.
Prestige’s Three Contrasted Profiles
For egalitarian humans first, displays of dominance and prestige mingle in a confusing
way in exterior politics. As mentioned above, synergistic displays of individual might
and bravery against enemies can bring major improvements to a team’s security, thus
deserving much merit in the eyes of teammates (interior politics), such prestige yet
remaining purely antagonistic in the eyes of enemy neighbors (exterior politics). But
this confounding effect is even stronger in a realm of hierarchical team synergy where,
in both interior and exterior politics, the same synergistic displays of strength and
stamina—in both collective hunting and collective defense, for example—provide
reliable indications about an individual’s combined synergistic and antagonistic poten-
tial, the latter remaining always available to enforce the internal rank order when
needed (Zahavi 1977, 1980). In this way, team-living animals (cooperative breeders)
can advertise their own antagonistic capacity, and appraise that of their teammates,
without necessarily confronting them directly—that is, without breaching within-team
discipline and without overtly contesting the current rank order. This notion of prestige
as a handy substitute for dominance has been repeatedly emphasized by Amotz Zahavi
(1977, 1990, 1995; Zahavi and Zahavi 1997) and followers, thus pointing to the
possible significance of prestige in animal cooperative breeders. However, two crucial
points remain to be acknowledged: (1) the fact that, within hierarchical teams such as
those of cooperative breeders, the quest for prestige is always restricted to each one
Hum Nat (2014) 25:299–327 311
according to one’s dominance, hence the proposed notion of a “limited-access,”
imposed form of prestige, whereas (2) the evolution of humans’ unique prosocial
capacities was driven by the quest for a purely “open-access,” freely granted form of
prestige, freed from dominance and only possible among antagonistic equals. Now,
these two points can be further clarified by combining them with the already discussed
differences between dominance and merit, this leading to three kinds of prestige, only
one exclusive to egalitarian humans:
P1: the low-profile, open-access compassionate prestige of egalitarian primus inter
pares
P2: the high-profile, limited-access authoritarian prestige of autocrats and hierarchical
leaders.
P3: the high-profile, bellicose prestige of warriors and conquerors.
In this view, P2 and P3 are familiar features of hierarchical team synergy in both
animals and humans, while P3 is also common in egalitarian humans’ exterior politics
(between-team competition). P1 is also familiar, but curiously, its political significance
seems less recognized even though it appears as the only human singularity. Conse-
quently, this paper’s core proposition can be more precisely rephrased as follows: the
competitive quest for open-access merit and low-profile compassionate prestige in a
realm of egalitarian team synergy is the single—necessarily veiled—politically selec-
tive process responsible for human uniqueness’s developmentally propelled evolution
all along the Paleolithic era (Fig. 2). Now, as a next step in this model’s exposition, the
following briefly examines how the confounding factors between dominance, merit,
and prestige would only strengthen all along human evolution’s three main eras, the
Paleolithic, the Neolithic, and the post-Neolithic.
Low-Profile Prestige’s Ups and Downs
Throughout the Paleolithic era—that is, within early humans’ egalitarian societies—
synergistic competition and the quest for open-access merit and compassionate prestige
(P1) would have been systematically downplayed by their best practitioners, thus
remaining clouded behind an enduring veil of declarative self-denial, with the ensuing
emphasis on collective rather than individual merit further adding to the blurring effect
of the latter’s intransitive and antisymmetrical multidimensionality. Despite this cloud-
iness, the salient and compassionate prestige of each group’s best synergists would
effectively guide the self-development of all groupmembers all along their political career,
such spontaneous mentorship thus ensuring the steady transmission of each group’s most
merit-worthy synergistic signals and cultural ways and means all along the Paleolithic.
As a result, competitive modesty, solidarity and compassionate altruism would
remain powerful yet derived (secondary) factors favoring the egalitarian team dynamics
primarily triggered and sustained by balanced deterrence. Therefore, being veiled and
always dependent on the primary factor of balanced deterrence, these derived factors
would rapidly lose much of their political traction during the Neolithic era, with the fast
return of overtly stratified societies triggered by balanced deterrence’s breakdown.
Indeed, a new capacity to stockpile nonperishable food resources such as grain and
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cattle would allow some Neolithic warrior elites to buy themselves personal militias,
thus putting an end to primeval egalitarianism. The salience of these nascent aristoc-
racies’ antagonistic manners, notably their uniquely conspicuous displays of material
riches, would henceforth confuse all human minds, these being strongly bent on the
egalitarian emulation of their most impressive elites—originally compassionate primus
inter pares, now obliviously turning into authoritarian protection-racketeers.
Nonetheless, thanks to their deep evolutionary roots, competitive modesty, compassion-
ate solidarity, and low-profile prestige (P1) would persist as powerful egalitarian and
synergistic propensities in all modern humans. But since these deep-seated cravings
strengthened the veil of ignorance over egalitarian synergy’s dynamics, they would often
remain politically defenseless in front of the high-profile prestige (P2& P3) of authoritarian
ruling classes, whose combined dominance and prestige could be backed-up by ever-
escalating antagonistic means of political power. The ensuing heavy fog of limited
awareness about humans’ brighter egalitarian heritage would only thicken with the advent
of the uniquely diverse and stratified cosmopolitan societies of post-Neolithic empires and
civilizations—contemporary winner-take-all meritocracies included (Frank 1999; Frank
and Cook 1996). Last but not least, the strong team-specificity of humans’ primeval
political counter-compassion would allow some human groups to conquer and ruthlessly
exploit other human groups, without the exploiters ever doubting their own “higher”merit-
worthiness. On the contrary, such between-group differences in mere antagonistic success
would be recurrently considered as “obvious” proofs of higher individual and collective
merit-worthiness, and thus, higher individual and collective intelligence (Diamond 1997).
This brief historical outline therefore suggests how, for the past ten thousand years
(since the onset of the Neolithic era and throughout recorded history) and without any
clear awareness of egalitarian synergy’s brighter dynamics, humans have been obliv-
iously envying and emulating political elites who most often advertised—and still
advertise—the silliest, most materially ostentatious, and thus most ill-adaptively at-
tractive forms of political status. No wonder why, then, the utmost contrasts between
the different kinds of political greed for different kinds of political status—dominance,
merit, P1, P2, and P3—are still mostly overlooked in both human behavioral ecology
and political economics. An insatiable greed for status can be a very powerful passion
indeed, driving individuals’ development and shaping animal and human societies in
all sorts of critical ways. But obviously, all forms of greed are not equal; hence the
importance of separating the light from the darkness in such strategic matters, espe-
cially in contemporary meritocratic economies (Frank 1999, 2007). For such darker
political aspects of human nature to be eventually overcome, their brighter counterparts
must first be properly understood. To this end, I turn to the abundant empirical evidence
on the universality of human hunter-gatherers’ egalitarianism, and then to the evolu-
tionary model proposed here to explain it. The whole is preceded by a brief review of
John Rawls’s (1971) famous top-down, virtual veil of ignorance, as opposed to the
bottom-up, adapted veil of ignorance discussed thus far.
From Virtual to Primeval Equality
Instead of an evolutionary outcome, Rawls’s (1971) veil of ignorance is a thought
experiment where a few virtual constituents are brought together so as to devise the
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social contract of a just society. For their decisions therein to be unbiased, the
constituents must be ignorant of their future endowments, both positive and negative,
thus ensuring the fairness of their future society’s institutions. Indeed, if no one knows
in advance how one will end up in this society, as fit or sick, or as master or slave, for
example, everyone will “logically” settle for institutions caring for the sick and barring
both masters and slaves. Such a veil of ignorance on the future therefore creates
hypothetical conditions from which normal humans can derive the principles of a
fair, egalitarian society. Yet, after almost four decades of fruitful developments in
political philosophy with this virtual approach, Amartya Sen (2009) recently empha-
sized its most important weakness: it is of great value to derive ideal principles, but
without any means to enforce these ideals, their practical utility remains questionable.
So, instead of pursuing such barely accessible ideals, Sen proposes a more realistic
approach focused on the correction of the actual world’s most flagrant and still
countless injustices.
However, such a step back away from the ideal can appear equally questionable in
view of the abundant anthropological evidence on human egalitarianism. Indeed, after
more than 300 years of “ethnographical” reports from all continents and latitudes,
egalitarianism—at least among men; the trickier condition of women is discussed
below—is one of the best documented human universals, typical of all hunter-
gatherer societies (Knauft 1991; reviewed in Boehm 1993, 1997, 1999, 2012; Erdal
and Whiten 1994, 1996:141–146). Although this “pristine” egalitarianism is often
underrated as a mere consequence of the material poverty of hunter-gatherer societies
as compared with the affluence of post-Neolithic stratified societies (see, e.g.,
Borgerhoff Mulder et al. 2009), such an underrating is most probably incorrect since
our closest relatives, the chimpanzees, build up materially much poorer yet hardly
egalitarian societies (Goodall 1986). Human egalitarianism is also often construed as a
mere insurance against the high variance of hunting returns (see, e.g., de Waal 1996).
However, chimpanzees also hunt, and they do share their kills, although very selec-
tively, not to mention the numerous social carnivores who share their common catches
but in a strictly biased, limited-access manner. This is in great contrast with the food
sharing of human hunter-gatherers, which is always strictly egalitarian. Indeed, after
reviewing much of the available qualitative and quantitative evidence, Erdal and
Whiten (1996:142) conclude that not only do all modern hunter-gatherers share food,
but “they do not share only with kin; they do not share only with those who reciprocate;
they share out what they have according to need, even when food is scarce.”
And there is still more to humans’ documented primeval egalitarianism: it is also a
unique instance of highly diversified whole-group cooperation, managed through
consensual decision-making and without any hierarchical order, only an informal
leadership without any coercive power (Erdal and Whiten 1996:144–145) but that of
deliberative persuasion. Again, this is in great contrast with chimpanzee males’ dom-
inance and sexual privileges (Goodall 1986; de Waal 1982). Once combined with the
fact that hunter-gatherer societies are always composed of many monogamous pairs
simultaneously raising numerous highly vulnerable families in close proximity (another
stark contrast with chimpanzee males’ paternal irresponsibility, as with other cooper-
ative breeders’ highly biased reproductive privileges), human hunter-gatherers’ univer-
sal pattern of closely knit, highly talkative, whole-group collective action in egalitarian
solidarity calls for an explanation. The balance of deterrence afforded by handheld
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weapons is the single cultural trigger proposed here to explain the origin of this
evolutionary singularity, with all its intricate mix of darker and brighter consequences.
Balanced deterrence is only a trigger, but it might be the sole trigger allowing upright-
walking primates to cross the uniquely demanding threshold separating hierarchical
from egalitarian—thus talkative—team synergy.
The following therefore proposes a plausible model of humankind’s origins, the
transition from pre-human chimpanzeelike hierarchical teams up to early humans’
egalitarian teams, the qualifier “chimpanzeelike” emphasizing the fact that modern
common chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) currently provide the best surviving models of
protohuman males (Foley 1989; Ghiglieri 1987; Rodseth et al. 1991; Wrangham
1987)—a model of bonobolike protohuman females is examined below. A most
paradoxical tale thus follows, where a simple cultural innovation, balanced deterrence
thanks to handheld “technological” weapons (Chapais 2008),3 rapidly pushes some of
the darkest antagonistic propensities of these chimpanzeelike males, their violence and
machismo (Wrangham and Peterson 1996), up to an almost total neutralization and
takeover by pure open-access synergistic competition in interior politics. Once imposed
on all males—even the strongest ones—all along their development, such a competi-
tion would bear unprecedented devo-evo consequences for all males, females, and
offspring, notably by throwing them all on the same runaway quest for open-access,
freely granted merit, and this, under the same compulsory veil of compassionate
modesty and generosity.
Balanced Deterrence
The “discovery” of balanced deterrence stemmed from one single behavior change: our
savanna-dwelling early male ancestors (most probably Homo erectus as explained
below) eventually losing the powerful chimpanzeelike political inhibitions that
prevented them from using handheld weapons (clubs, sticks, and stones) to injure
fellow teammates. Why such political inhibitions at first? Because, for teamed-up
philopatric males specialized in the defense and expansion of a common territory so
as to attract and retain exogamic females, the stringent requirements of team solidarity
in exterior politics (between-team antagonistic competition) select for strictly inhibited,
bloodless and weaponless combats in interior politics (within-team antagonistic
competition). The modern common chimpanzee (Pan troglodytes) offers a good
illustration of such deep-seated political inhibitions (Boesch and Boesch-Achermann
2000; de Waal 1982; Goodall 1986; Nishida 1990; Wilson and Wrangham 2003)
among mutually dependent obligate teammates. Chimpanzee males are indeed at the
same time highly xenophobic, bellicose territory conquerors and proficient tool users.
Remarkably, their technical culture is clearly overspecialized in subsistence technology
(Whiten et al. 1999) and completely lacks fighting tools. For instance, chimpanzees
carefully choose stones for cracking nuts, but they would never crack the skull of an
3 The present model agrees with Chapais (2008:176–177) on the deterrence power of “technological”
weapons and the ensuing momentous consequences of pair-bonding on early humans’ sociality. However,
the present model diverges markedly on the preferred primate model for protohuman societies. This difference
is discussed farther below.
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opponent. Not that they are peaceful; quite the contrary: chimpanzee males can be very
aggressive in within-team competition, and they are also extremely violent, determined,
and uninhibited in between-team hostilities (Mitani et al. 2010). Yet, they remain
essentially weaponless, bare-handed fighters in within-team conflicts, and they are also
very ineffective, weaponless, and bare-handed bullies with captured neighbors
(Goodall 1986; Wrangham 1999; Mitani et al. 2010). Their arboreal chases and escapes
also impede weapon-carrying and weapon use. Overall, even if most of their antago-
nistic displays seemingly aim at inspiring terror, they remain as “bloodless” as possible
in interior politics and the exact opposite in exterior politics.
Therefore, among already bipedal and similarly inhibited chimpanzeelike early
humans, routine weapon-carrying and weapon use probably first developed for per-
sonal protection purposes because of the savanna’s scarcer arboreal refuges and much
more numerous large predators. Then, once accustomed to routine weapon use against
large predators (Kortlandt 1980),4 an essentially technical achievement affordable to
both males and females, our male ancestors probably started using their handheld
weapons in exterior politics (for territory defense and expansion so as to attract more
females), thus becoming increasingly effective and politically uninhibited when terror-
izing neighbors. Finally, once familiar with such uninhibited weapon use in exterior
politics, the new fighting habit could spill over into the realm of interior antagonistic
politics where such perilous experiments were previously impossible. It takes the
repeated experience of weapon use in the synergistic solidarity of exterior politics
(between-team terror), with the shared benefits of a more secure common territory to
attract more females, to relax and eventually overcome the powerful inhibitions
otherwise forbidding such experimentations in interior politics (within-team terror).
But then, such a simple yet strategic cultural innovation—again within a species of
philopatric males already specialized in chimpanzeelike synergistic solidarity in exte-
rior politics—would bear numerous consequences, both technical and political, which
rapidly combined into a whole new way of life with a clear paleontological signature.
Technically, in a brachiator’s hands, the kinetic power of a club’s blow or of a stick’s
stab can be tremendous. As a fossilizable result, fighting with clubs should have
selected for strengthened cranial bones, and Wolpoff (1980:177–178) reports such a
thickening of the cranial vault for early Homo erectus, with brow ridges virtually
doubled in size compared with earlier species, and with many reported healed scars,
usually interpreted as hunting wounds. But political scars are also likely, and indeed,
while suspecting ritualized head-bashing contests among males, Boaz and Ciochon
(2004:78–88) emphasize the overtly defensive character of Homo erectus’ skull, its
remarkable thickness being further reinforced by four equally remarkable interconnect-
ed bony bulges (torus occipitalis, t. angularis, t. supraorbitalis, and crista sagittalis),
none of which needed as a muscle attachment ridge. This heavily armored skull makes
Homo erectus a likely candidate as the first effective master of technological terror
among hominids.
The evolution of Homo erectus’ armored skull necessarily took some time. But from
the onset, it was much easier and faster to lose inhibitions than to evolve bodily and
4 Kortlandt’s (1980) numerous defensive experiments with the savanna’s large predators show that these can
be kept at a safe distance with a single hand-waved thorny branch, one of acacia for example. Indeed, if stuck
into an eye or the muzzle, a single thorn can jeopardize survival even for the largest felines.
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behavioral parries against primeval yet diversified handheld weapons. Moreover, since
weapon use is a cultural habit, it could spread rapidly to all rungs of the preexisting
antagonistic ladder. As a result, even lower-ranking males could now impose dreadful
blows on their strongest competitors, especially in surprise attacks, the ensuing evenly
distributed capacity to inflict terrorizing wounds leading to a genuine balance of
deterrence in within-team antagonistic competition. Two features of this kind of
political equilibrium must be underlined:
1. Balanced terror between individuals of unequal force results from the salient
mutilating and incapacitating power of hand-accelerated weapons.
2. Such a balance of terror cannot evolve through ordinary genetic selection. Indeed,
bodily weapons (horns, teeth, claws, muscles, etc.) evolve slowly, in step with
behavioral defenses and bodily armors, the ensuing deterrence power being always
dependent on age, weight and experience. As a result, the smallest differences in
overall antagonistic capacity most often allow a profitable antagonistic order to be
established, however short-lived it may be.5
The contrast between bodily and cultural weaponry is therefore striking: a sharp
stick in the belly, or a club’s blow on the skull, necessarily have dreadful effects,
whatever the weight or size of the attacker. In combination with related greatly
increased risks in between-team clashes, the ensuing within-team balanced terror would
thus favor a totally unprecedented kind of team-wise political order: within-team
antagonistic equality in males, with uniquely increased needs for team solidarity
(synergistic political stability), arising from two complementary factors. First, among
uninhibited users of handheld weapons, personal security comes to depend much less
on personal strength than on a capacity to make reliable friends since such primitive
weapons only ensure a one-to-one equality, which breaks down at two against one;
hence the necessity of competitive recruitment and defensive quorum formation. But
second, within-team antagonistic equality in males would greatly improve the repro-
ductive potential of all but the strongest male dominants, who would now have to share
mating opportunities as never before. This improved sexual and political equality in
males would thus foster monogamy and paternal investment (see below), which would
equally benefit all females and infants by ensuring them an equal access to all the
5 Note that because of dangerous bodily weapons, but also as a response to specially harsh pressures from
predators or neighbors, some social animals spontaneously evolve milder hierarchies, sometimes nearing
egalitarianism (Vehrencamp 1983). However, such a slow progress toward egalitarianism does not favor team
synergy, for many interrelated reasons. First, whole-group team synergy can only emerge from an already
stable rank order, with alpha dominants as leaders. But then, in order for it to develop further, teamwork must
also be more productive than mere solitary work, with this greater productivity thus necessarily fueling both
(1) the greater antagonistic competition associated with the division of teamwork’s greater collective outputs
and (2) the greater synergistic competition associated with the greater requirements of teamwork’s manage-
ment (leadership, followership, division of labor, etc.). Therefore, whatever the hierarchical order’s steepness
from the onset, whole-group team synergy can only evolve toward even greater steepness for both the
antagonistic and the synergistic political ladders. As a result, for team synergy to become egalitarian as it
did in early humans, balanced deterrence must develop rapidly thanks to cultural weapons, and among animals
already specialized in the mutual dependence and the disciplined forms of antagonistic and synergistic
competition typical of hierarchical teams.
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material requirements of daily survival—notably food, shelter, and protection. But this
would then boost demographic expansion, within-team and between-team antagonistic
competition, and the associated need for long-term solidarity with sufficient teammates.
The transformation of our ancestors’ mating behavior is examined first.
Bonobolike Females
In contrast with males, protohuman females were probably more bonobolike than
chimpanzeelike. Indeed, the modern bonobos (Pan paniscus) provide a better model
to understand the improved solidarity of these females (Wrangham 1993), life in the
savanna imposing on them much fewer daily dispersions (fissions-fusions) than those
of forest-dwelling chimpanzee females (Pruetz and Bertolani 2009); hence the im-
proved familiarity and possible solidarity of protohuman females. However, as pro-
posed by O’Connell et al. (1999, 2002), protohuman females probably had a much
harder time provisioning their children than chimpanzee and bonobo females do
because (1) the scavenged meat and marrow provided by males was most probably
too scant and unpredictable (but see Bunn and Gurtov 2014) and (2) the savanna’s
abundant and nourishing tubers were much harder to unearth and process, as compared
with the simple picking of fruits that chimpanzee offspring can rapidly manage. As a
result, protohuman females had a heavy parental burden, and they probably remained
dominated by their philopatric males, specialists of “high-profile” terror politics, zero
paternal investment, and meat and marrow provisioning as mere self-promotional
displays.
How would all this change once antagonistic equality became firmly established
among males? Within-team balanced deterrence among males would first offer lower-
ranking males new, unprecedented opportunities for mate choice and mate guarding
within the stable consortships normally sought after by lower-ranking chimpanzee
males (Goodall 1986). Because such consortships would no longer be disrupted by
higher-ranking males, pair-bonding would begin to be favored from the bottom of the
political ladder up. Conversely, from the top down the same ladder, once the quest for
modest and compassionate merit became firmly established as the rule of the political
game, the more coveted and merit-worthy males and females would tend to pair
together and avoid overt extra-pair solicitations so as not to overshadow their lesser
competitors, thus avoiding demerit and the risk of quorum punishment. As a result,
from both ends of the political ladder, all males and females would tend to pair with
sexual partners of comparable merit and synergistic fitness, thus favoring monogamy,
as predicted by the famous “stable matching algorithm” of Gale and Shapley (1962).
This in turn would rapidly select for paternal investment, family protection, concealed
ovulation, and reduced sexual dimorphism in sexually bonded pairs. Indeed, improved
possibilities for all human males to claim and defend well-identified females would
foster paternal investment, but it would also make their no-longer-promiscuous females
uniquely vulnerable to the sexual and infanticidal harassment by other males (Hrdy
1977; Smuts and Smuts 1993), thus rapidly selecting for concealed ovulation. That is,
monogamy would relieve human females from their ancestor’s chimpanzee/
bononbolike defenses based on advertised ovulation and sexual promiscuity for pater-
nity confusion and infanticide avoidance (van Schaik and Janson 2000; Wrangham
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1993).6 In contrast, concealed ovulation and the benefits of solid parental pairs would
drive human females’ sexual receptivity toward its exuberance, continuity, and pair-
wise selectivity. The ensuing sturdier, sexually bonded pairs with helpful and depend-
able fathers would greatly improve the reproductive output of early human mothers,
through earlier weaning, more numerous pregnancies and simultaneously dependent
children, but also thanks to the egalitarian solidarity of other mothers (Hrdy 2009) and
grandmothers (O’Connell et al. 1999). This in turn would fuel the unique demo-
geographical expansion of Homo erectus.
This trend away from chimpanzeelike male irresponsibility would also bolster the
need for political stability. Indeed, because of human infants’ vulnerability and unique-
ly prolonged dependency, long-term family security among diverging quorums and
factions would require uniquely prolonged and reliable associations within sufficiently
large teams. Dispersion would thus be often precluded, and the ensuing increased
number of reproductive pairs within each team would inevitably increase the risks of
unmanageable conflicts, with related heightened risks of political instability and polit-
ical scissions. This is where balanced deterrence produces its most paradoxical effects
since, while precluding dispersion and fueling an unprecedented need for political
stability, it also fuels political instability and political scissions, neutralizing the fore-
most factor of political stability in all other team-living animals (notably cooperative
breeders): a stable antagonistic rank order with the related policing services normally
provided by all teammates according to their dominance rank (Clutton-Brock and
Parker 1995). In such peculiar circumstances, another strategic life-insurance stake
fuels the escalation of both egalitarian solidarity and synergistic competition, the quest
for differential merit remaining a daily necessity so as to eventually win preferential
assistance in times of collective hardship. This latter challenge was briefly evoked
above (“Political Selection’s Devo-Evo Mechanics”), and it can now be discussed in
more detail. Again, it appears as a key “evo” factor responsible for the biological fitness
(differential reproduction) which stemmed from modest and compassionate merit all
along humans’ egalitarian past.
Runaway Solidarity
First, it should be recalled that, for our egalitarian ancestors with uniquely prolonged
parental responsibilities, one obvious benefit of team solidarity and enlightened team-
mate choice becomes the protection that they provide against individual misfortunes of
all sorts (sicknesses, disabling injuries, etc.), any one of which can jeopardize many
6 In a similar proposition about the evolutionary significance of “technological”weapons, Chapais (2008:176–
177) argues that, instead of fostering monogamy, balanced deterrence among chimpanzeelike human males
would instead increase scramble sexual competition (sperm competition) among them, thus leading to
increased sexual promiscuity instead of pair-bonding. But this argument neglects the fact that sexual
promiscuity is not a male but a female strategy to confuse paternity and avoid infanticide. Instead, Chapais
models early human males as polygynous harem builders, united within multiharem structures similar to those
of hamadryas baboons. However, such loosely associated males lack the political habit and benefits of team
synergy and solidarity in exterior politics first necessary to develop weapon use against enemy neighbors,
before importing this innovative behavior in the realm of interior politics, where such technical tinkering is
otherwise hardly possible. Indeed, any trial of this type by lower-ranking males would be immediately
thwarted by stronger dominants who themselves don’t need such technical expedients.
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years of parental investment. This is in great contrast with what happens in the
hierarchical teams of other cooperative breeders, where non-breeding helpers care for
a dominant pair’s seasonal progeny. Among early humans, many monogamous pairs
were simultaneously raising vulnerable infants, any one of which could be lost after just
a few days of parental incapacity during the many years of offspring dependency. Such
a unique vulnerability combines with the mutilation risks brought about by weapon use
in between-team conflicts. Since anyone can be stricken in such circumstances, and
since any teammate can help, a tightly bonded team becomes a mutual insurance
arrangement to which all teammates must subscribe in order to get the necessary
assistance when required.
But there is a most peculiar twist to such an insurance arrangement among a small
number of egalitarian “subscribers.” Indeed, not only is a good political record neces-
sary to be assisted in case of individual misfortune (Gurven et al. 2000), but, as
mentioned above, many instances of individual bad luck happen in circumstances of
collective hardship in which (1) the progenies of many reproductive pairs are simulta-
neously at risk and, consequently, (2) the mutual fund’s capacity to protect its sub-
scribers against the ongoing risks is overwhelmed by the number of claimants. Thus,
with many teammates simultaneously in need of assistance, the ability of a victim and
her progeny to be assisted will not depend on the absolute amount of “premiums” paid
into the mutual fund. It will rather depend on the difference between the total premiums
paid by different victims (the difference between their previously accumulated merit),
with the most-esteemed victims tending to gather a greater part of the limited available
help. For example, in the heat of a surprise attack by enemy neighbors, with many
casualties all around, one will tend to help one’s alpha best friend before one’s gamma
best friend.
This is therefore another critical reason why the “devo” quest for differential merit
would remain a necessity for all humans whatever their sex and seniority, with the
smallest differences in accumulated merit (political fitness) having potentially critical
consequences on survival and differential reproduction (biological fitness), especially
in times of evolutionary bottlenecks. And again, because all surpluses in merit had to be
downplayed in order to benefit their owners, this political imperative would only
strengthen the competition for fairness and generosity behind the veil of competitive
modesty and compassion. Paradoxically then, despite its inherent political instability,
and beyond the inflation of synergistic communications that it fosters, another major
consequence of our ancestors’ dread-laden egalitarianism would have been a most
cheerful expansion of a competitive quest to make friends with as many teammates as
possible, by sharing their joys and sorrows and by playing on their preferences, notably
for competent teamwork and dependable solidarity in hardships. Such a runaway quest
would select for uniquely powerful capacities and cravings for empathy, fairness, and
compassion. In sum, balanced terror would transform early humans into champions of
friendship and virtuosos of empathy and solidarity, a rare evolutionary quirk.
Ecce Homo
This model explains many contradictory aspects of hunter-gatherers’ sociality that have
always been difficult to reconcile, notably (1) the most cheerful aspects of primitive
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humans’ egalitarianism, which have fascinated the New World’s early European
discoverers and many contemporary cultural anthropologists, and (2) the much darker
aspects pertaining to warfare with endless cycles of collective revenge, between-group
terror, ritual torture, and cannibalism (Chagnon 1988; Keeley 1996; LeBlanc and
Register 2003; Meggitt 1977; Staden 1557, among others). The century-old myth of
the noble savage may not be a complete myth after all, with nobility’s functional roots
being veiled in interior politics and overshadowed by their darker counterparts in
exterior politics. Among these darker aspects, antagonistic equality among men also
explains the extremely variable status of women in hunter-gatherer societies, a status
which can vary from near equality to the worst forms of subordination (Hayden et al.
1986). Indeed, balanced deterrence among monogamous men would result in antago-
nistic equality for all of a group’s families—that is, equal access to all of daily
survival’s material requirements (food, shelter, etc.) for all men, women, and children.
But despite this broad material equality, the antagonistic subordination of women
would persist for two reasons: (1) because of the recurring and prolonged periods of
lesser political leeway associated with pregnancies, breast feeding, child care, and other
highly demanding, family-focused maternal duties (a heavily biased mammalian bur-
den which would only lessen thanks to modern contraception) but also, and most
importantly, (2) because of the uniquely demanding political challenges resulting from
early human females’ chimpanzee/bonobolike exogamy (Ghiglieri 1987; Wrangham
1987). Indeed, exogamy forces all adults of the migrant sex (here, females) to start their
political career—their political self-construction—afresh within the new competitive
environment of their group of adoption, an extremely challenging endeavor demanding
an added amount of low-profile, synergistic knack and tact, together with an added
amount of talkative competence. Therefore, the antagonistic subordination of women
would not reduce the pressures of synergistic competition upon them—quite the
contrary. It would make political self-construction and the quest for merit separate
intrasexual arenas, with each gender developing specialized areas of expertise
(Murdock 1969). Then, because of the pressures and necessities of mate choice and
parental pair formation, each gender’s intrasexual synergistic contests would necessar-
ily unfold under the close scrutiny of the opposite sex, which would result in a most
demanding twofold form of whole-group synergistic competition, with everyone trying
to excel in one’s intrasexual sphere of competence, thus simultaneously maximizing
one’s chances of success in the realm of intersexual partner choice. Since excellence is
most often measured in contributions to the common good, the following briefly
reviews how such team-wide synergistic competition powerfully fuels the transmission
and expansion of the best of each group’s culture.
Egalitarian Culture’s Veiled Magic
Hunter-gatherers’ egalitarianism thus becomes a remarkable political system in which
the elite is normally composed of the most esteemed and admired individuals, those
who bring the most to the common good while taking less for themselves. In so doing,
this open-access elite of mentors and primus inter pares exerts more synergistic
influence, and it piles up more merit and prestige. But by producing and contributing
more collective benefits, this synergistic elite also advertises the best practices in many
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domains of expertise—the most effective and appreciated technical and political
behaviors. Translated into contemporary terms, those of modern liberal democracies,
these meritocratic elites do not claim for themselves any material privilege—an impe-
rative self-restraint in a realm of competitive low-profile prestige and dignity. As a
reward for their higher contribution to the common good, they are instead given more
influence on technical and political quorum formation. That is, they are granted a
greater influence on different aspects of collective action and collective deliberations—
and therefore a greater capacity to contribute to the common good, and thus pile up
more merit and low-profile compassionate prestige. Of course, the advertisement of
such elite practices requires individual qualities such as competence, know-how,
generosity, effectiveness, trustworthiness, modesty, compassion, etc., synergistic qual-
ities that can build up to different levels from one individual to the next. But since these
qualities are purely informational riches, they can all be shared without impoverishing
their owners. To the contrary, such qualities must be shared and displayed in order to be
turned into individual assets such as merit, thus favoring their imitation by younger or
lesser competitors. As a result, the more these qualities are displayed by their best
practitioners, the more they can be imitated by followers and admirers. This uniquely
synergistic magic has two important consequences.
First, it always levels the field of synergistic competition since, as emphasized
above, to preserve their leadership and prestige, elite competitors must always be both
modest about their expertise and generous in sharing it, thus allowing less-advanced
followers to catch up. But second, as a result of this leveled competitive field, the quest
for synergistic influence through the advertisement of such elite synergistic expertise
powerfully sustains the cross-generational persistence and expansion of this expertise,
with everyone emulating the most appreciated performers to the benefit of all. In fact,
synergistic expertise needs to be shared, exploited, and thus advertised and emulated so
as to persist in its adopters’ behavioral repertoire through the generations. And indeed,
thanks to its informational nature, this synergistic cultural wealth can be shared
indefinitely without risk of depletion: the more it is shared, the more it persists and
expands, and the more it empowers its egalitarian sharers, both individually and
collectively. Yet of course, nothing guarantees the soundness of the adopted behaviors:
early humans unknowingly made all sorts of costly mistakes—notably, overexploiting
their ecological environment and its megafauna (Barnosky et al. 2004; Martin and
Klein 1984) or waging costly battles between rival quorums. But despite these un-
avoidable shortcomings of synergistic politics, the faithful transmission of egalitarian
culture did guarantee that any expertise contributing to a group’s common good—
rhetorical expertise, notably—would be faithfully transmitted down the generations, the
ensuing cumulative process of political niche construction being thus propelled and
sustained by the quest for open-access merit or, more precisely, by the simple trial-and-
error “devo” process of “competitive synergistic self-construction among antagonistic
equals” (Fig. 2).
Of course, synergistic self-construction requires a lot of social learning (learning
from others), as emphasized by all current models of culture transmission (see, as a
telling example, Boyd et al. 2011). However, in the realm of political synergy, such an
essentially technical form of social learning appears as a tactical means to a much
broader, all-encompassing end, that of political self-construction (political fitness-
building). This latter end is all-encompassing because, beyond usual social learning
322 Hum Nat (2014) 25:299–327
(learning from others), it involves two other informational tasks of utmost significance:
synergistic who’s who learning (learning about others’ synergistic fitness) and syner-
gistic self-promotion (teaching others about the self’s synergistic fitness). In contrast to
antagonistic fitness, whose salience and symmetrical one-dimensionality makes it easy
to assess, the intransitive antisymmetrical multidimensionality of synergistic fitness
makes it much harder to assess. Every dimension of merit must be witnessed in order to
be appreciated, and any single behavior can reveal precious details about a partner-
competitor’s synergistic strengths and weaknesses in one or another domain; hence the
permanent necessity of vigilant synergistic who’s who learning and synergistic self-
promotion (who’s who teaching), upstream from mere technical (what’s what) learning.
Remarkably, then, the fact that most current models ignore these crucial political
requirements of culture’s transmission further supports the idea that a now-ill-adapted
veil of ignorance still conceals the magical dynamics of competitive synergistic self-
construction among peers (Fig. 3).
Incidentally, note also how the same veil of ignorance explains another puzzling
aspect of behavioral theories, the fact that cooperation is most often conceived as the
opposite of unqualified “competition.” In contrast, the distinction proposed here be-
tween the two opposite forms—antagonistic and synergistic competition—clearly
emphasizes at least three crucial facts:
Transmission of both 
political and technical 
culture
Synergistic self-construction 1
Social learning: Learning from others'




In front of the veil
Synergistic (who's who) learning:
Learning about others' synergistic fitness
&
Synergistic self-promotion:





Fig. 3 Upstream from mere social learning: An expanded model of cultural transmission through competitive
synergistic self-construction. (1) This model applies to both antagonistic and synergistic self-construction.
However, antagonistic self-construction is hardly veiled, even though the associated, political forms of who’s
who learning and teaching seem more neglected. (2) “Technical (what’s what) knowledge” essentially refers to
the ecological environment, that is: (a) inanimate things (plants, shelters, migration routes, etc.); (b) animals
without an individual identity (prey, predators, ecological competitors, etc.). By contrast, political (who’s who)
knowledge refers to familiar group-mates with an individual identity, and therefore knowledge about these
individuals’ political fitness, both antagonistic and synergistic
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1. that cooperation is far from always devoid of competition in social animals (see, for
example, Roberts 1998; Zahavi 1977), especially when many would-be partners of
variable effectiveness or trustworthiness are available (Noë and Hammerstein
1994); and therefore
2. that competition is far from always exclusively antagonistic or zero-sum; and finally
3. that humans are by far Nature’s most gifted specialists of a uniquely egalitarian and
communicatively demanding form of team synergy—hence the necessity to lift the
veil of ignorance over this kind of political synergy to understand human uniqueness.
The Magic of Informational Commons
In conclusion, one crucial aspect of the human condition deserves final emphasis in
light of the often-evoked distinction between material and immaterial/informational
resources and constructions. In this view, humans’ uniqueness stems from their capac-
ity to build up and share huge informational megastructures, those of language and
culture, which are intangible pyramids of meaning cumulatively built up by thousands
of generations of fellow humans. Again, because of their immaterial nature, these
common informational riches can be shared indefinitely without risk of depletion.
And this is in great contrast to all material riches, which should be exploited sparingly
and efficiently so as to make sure everyone gets a fair and sustainable share. The fact
that contemporary humans still cannot reach a sturdy consensus on the perils of
material greed within limited material commons (Meadows et al. 1972, 2004) appears
somewhat paradoxical, to say the least, and again it points to the veil of ignorance over
the other contrasted kind of immaterial greed responsible for humans’ huge informa-
tional commons (language, knowledge, and culture). These informational commons are
invaluable public goods whose cumulative construction through millennia is still barely
clarified by science. Yet, if the “egalitarian hypothesis” of human uniqueness outlined
here is sound, the steady inflation of these common informational goods during more
than 1.5 M yrs was driven by an insatiable greed for purely individual, immaterial
(who’s who) assets such as merit and prestige, among people sharing all their material
riches equally. As a result, because of its intransitive antisymmetrical multidimension-
ality, and because it had to be downplayed, this insatiable greed for individual merit and
prestige could have also concealed its most cheerful collective outcome, the simple
magic behind the expansion of humanity’s immaterial commons. In other words, the
now-ill-adapted veil of ignorance over synergistic self-construction among
equals would have hidden the genuinely magical process of informational niche
construction (Laland et al. 2000; Odling-Smee et al. 1996) behind humanity’s
most precious assets, its magnificent, infinitely sharable and expandable informational
commons.
In this view, humanity’s common stock of volatile yet infinitely sharable knowledge
clearly becomes the only world in which unlimited growth is possible, the only market
economy in which insatiable greed and boundless self-enrichment are both compatible
with the common good and achievable for all participants, the only ecological niche
whose unremitting exploitation is absolutely necessary for its own preservation and
development. It is also a collective masterwork bequeathed by thousands of generations
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of clever fellow humans, unaware virtuosos of egalitarian solidarity. A collective
masterwork, moreover, whose enhanced sharing and further expansion in the form of
science and technology is now absolutely necessary to build up a more enlightened,
more sustainable future for humanity’s overexploited material common, planet Earth
with its endangered biosphere and atmosphere. In contrast to the optimism of pre-
Darwinian science and the Age of Enlightenment, post-Darwinian science has most
often been either very pessimistic about human nature (Dawkins 1976; Trivers 2011) or
tragically misguided by the numerous political and economic guises of so-called Social
Darwinism. The present paper suggests how humans’ synergistic blindness could have
contributed to such pessimism and misconceptions. Could it be that an improved
Darwinian understanding of humans’ unique synergistic and egalitarian propensities
might finally allow the fulfillment of a longstanding humanistic dream, that of whole-
humankind egalitarian synergy?
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